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Introduction
Traditional microeconomic theory envisages three types of economic
agents-consumers, firms (entrepreneurs), and resource holders. This
classification, however, fails to accommodate numerous decision-making
units, such as governments, political parties, and labor unions, that can-
not be ignored in explaining and predicting economic phenomena. In
agriculturaleconomics, the cooperativeassociationissuchaninstitution.
At first blush one might be inclined to view it as a firm of perhaps a
special type. Several students ofcooperation, however-particularly Ivan
EmelianoffandRichardPhillips-haveevolveda theoryinwhichthe coop-
erative association is not viewed as a firm. 1Another student, in reply, has
called for a "broader interpretation of the definition of a firm in accord
with actualities" which would encompass a cooperative association as a
firm and as a "going concern."2
The purpose ofthis paper is to show that organization theory provides
a broader interpretation ofthe firm that is useful for empirical research
on cooperative decision making. It will also be shown that by making
certain assumptions within an organizational framework, the marginal
analysis can be used in deriving hypotheses about cooperative perfor-
mance in much the same way as it has been used in traditional theory.
The Present Controversy
Webeginwitha briefreviewofthepresentcontroversyovertheeconomic
nature ofcooperative associations. The cooperative enterprise is usually
heldto be a non-profitinstitutiongUided bythe principle ofserviceatcost
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after the business enterprise with a decision-making unit (entrepreneur)
motivatedbyprofit, does notjibewellwiththenatureofa trulycooperative
association.3
Emelianoff regards a cooperative association as an aggregate of eco-
nomic units each fully retainingits independence in seeking profits. Phil-
lips accepts this view, arguing that a member firm should be treated as
a multi-plant, vertically integrated firm. He writes, "the entrepreneurs
of the associated firms each must allocate productive resources to their
commOn plant, the same as a multi-plant firm must allocate resources to
each ofits plants."4
With this conception ofthe cooperative association, all ofthe attention
is centered on the entrepreneurs ofthe member firms, and the problem
which remains is one of specifYing their optimum rules ofbehavior with
profitmaximizationasthepostulatednorm. Inspellingoutprofit-maximiz-
ing conditions for the cooperating firms, Phillips-by analogy-relies on
the criteriadeducedbyHirsch for a verticallyintegratedfirm.5 Criteriaare
setforth for cost minimization, optimum output, and optimum size ofthe
cooperative plant.
It is unnecessary to critically appraise Phillips' theory here. This has
alreadybeen done by others.6 The basic objection to the theory can easily
be seen by giving Hirsch's definition of a vertically integrated firm: "A
vertically integrated firm is a single profit maximizing entity, in which a
number of units, each performing different functions in the production
and/ormarketingofsimilarcommoditiesonsuccessivelevels, arebrought
under a single managerial control."7 It is apparent that Phillips' analogy
between a cooperating firm and a vertically integrated firm as defined by
Hirschisuntenable.Theparticipatingmemberofa cooperativeassociation
cannotingeneralbeassumed to manage the cooperativeplantand opera-
tions. Through membership, he commits himselfto abide by group deci-
sions. Strangely enough, this point has been sharply drawn by Robotka,
oneofthewritersuponwhomPhillips'workispresumablybased.8 Inbrief,
the frame ofreference espousedby Phillips does notreflectthe emergence
ofa new decision-making unit upon the organization of a cooperative.
Organization in the Business Enterprise
Andreas Papandreou has outlined a frame ofreference for the study of
the firm based on earlierworkin organization theory, notably the work of
ChesterBarnardand HerbertSimon.9 Papandreou argues thatan organi-
zationalapproachwillaidinthetreatmentofproblemsofconsciouscoordi-
nationofactivitieswithinthefirmincontrasttotheunconsciouscoordina-
tion ofeconomic activityviathemarketmechanism. We proposeadopting
an organizational approach for the study ofthe cooperative association.
In this way, the cooperative association may be thought ofas a firm, with
a resulting conceptual framework which has certain advantages over the
one used by Phillips.
Centraltothedefinitionofthefirmhereadoptedistheconceptoforgani-
zationwhich ChesterBarnard defines as a "system ofconsciously coordi-
nated activities of two or more persons."l0 In light ofthis concept, a firm
may be defined as a cooperativeII system which consists oforganization,74 JOURNAL OF COOPERATIVES 1995
persons who contribute activity to the organization, and privately owned
physical plant; and in which (1) economic resources are mobilized, (2)
goodsandservicesareproducedforsale, and (3) primaryrelianceisplaced
on the proceeds from the sale of the product to meet production costs.
This definition of the firm is not pegged on the existence of an owner-
manager type entrepreneur, nor does it insist that the firm be a profit-
making entity. The key to the definition is the concept of organization
which we shall now take up in greater detail.
Organization can emerge only when (1) persons contribute activity to
the system, (2) participants share one or more common goals, and (3)
communicationamongparticipantsispresent. Personscontributeactivity
throughacceptingcertainroleswhichtheorganizationimposesuponthem
as a requirement for membership. Persons will contribute activity, how-
ever, onlyiftheir own individual goals are furthered thereby. This implies
that participants must be provided with inducements which, in the case
ofa firm, mighttaketheformofwages, opportunitiesforpromotion,emolu-
ments' fringe benefits, and so forth.
Activityalone does notgive rise to organization. Itmustbe given a sense
ofdirection, Le., coordinated toward the achievement ofcertain ends. In
ordertounderstandtheproblemsassociatedwith consciouscoordination,
consider a firm which embodies a more or less complicated organization.
Thegoalsofthefirmarenormallyformulatedatthetopleveloftheadminis-
trative hierarchy, but are actually implemented by the physical tasks
performed by the operatives at the lowest administrative levels. To the
executives at various levels or segments ofthe organization fall the tasks
ofplanning and coordinating activities which will facilitate attainment of
certain ends and impart to the total system a rational character.
Action takes place at all levels ofthe organizational hierarchy and to be
purposive must be preceded by decision-making processes. Simon holds
that every decision involves factual and value premises.12 In a word, a
value premise is related to a choice ofultimate goals whereas a presumed
factualpremiseconcernsthemeansforgoalachievementand, inprinciple,
can be tested to determine whether it is true or false. An organizational
participantarmedonlywithfactualpremisescouldlinkalternativeactions
with certain consequences, but his behavior would evince randomness
aplenty were he unable to judge the desirability of those consequences.
In order to rank possible consequences according to their desirability he
must also incorporate value premises in choice selection. If organization
isto exist, theparticipantsmustadoptthosedecisionalpremisesinchoosing
among alternative courses oj action which will give rise to consciously
coordinated activity. One cannot suppose that the matter of supplying
organizational participants with the relevant factual and value premises
is merely one ofchance. Indeed, a central problem in organization theory
relates to an explanation of how this is to be brought about. We cannot
here pursue at great length the organization theorist's line ofreasoning,
but there are two further facets ofhis model which warrant our perusal.
These are the concepts ofauthority and communication.13
An individual may be said to be subject to authority if"he sets himself
a general rule which permits the communicated decision of another toCooperative Enterprise and Organization Theory/Heimberger and Haas 75
gUide his own choices (Le., to serve as a premise ofthose choices) without
deliberation on his part on the expediencyofthose premises."14Authority
is essentially the power to gUide and control (within limits, however) the
actions ofanother. Following Papandreou, we may assume the existence
of a "peak coordinator" consisting of a person or group of persons that,
for onereason oranother, wields effective authorityoverall organizational
participants in the firm. 15 The peak coordinator is not to be associated
necessarily with a board of directors, the chief executive, the manager,
and so forth, but rather to the person or group ofpersons that specifies
the ends ofthe firm and engages in action to secure their attainment.
Itisthroughcommunicationsthatthe decisionalpremisesaretransmit-
tedfrom onememberofanorganizationto another. Authoritativecommu-
nications involving to a large extent the value premises implicit in the
organizational goals can be expected to flow downward for the most part.
Communicationsinvolvingprimarilyfactualpremisesmayflowinalldirec-
tions. Inthis connection, itis crucialto notethatthe organizationtheorist
rejectsthenotion of"economicman"withhisprofoundknowledgeinfavor
of "administrative man" who must contend with limited information and
computational ability. It behooves the administrative hierarchy, then, to
(1) gather data and information needed for expertise in decision-making,
(2) carry out programs oftraining and orientation, and (3) transmit infor-
mation from various sources to the decision centers where it is needed.
Byway ofsummary, the concept ofthe firm here adopted comprehends
a cooperative system consisting ofphysical plant, persons, and organiza-
tion.Tosetthefirmofffromothercooperativesystems, a municipalgovern-
ment for example, itis also necessary to assign ownership ofthe physical
plant to private agents and to note the economic functions which the
cooperative system performs. The peak coordinator is assigned a central
role and performs certain functions ordinarily attributed to the entrepre-
neur. Although the peak coordinator is in a position of authority, deter-
mines the ends ofthe firm, and undertakes action to secure their attain-
ment, he may be completely dissociated with ownership of the firm and
bearnone ofthe corresponding risks. Notice further that no commitment
has been made as regards the ends ofthe system. Ifone wishes to adopt
a conception of the firm sufficiently broad so as to accommodate the
cooperativeenterprise, thenclearlytheassumption ofprofitmaximization
must be considered a special case.16
The Cooperative as a Firm
It should be clear that the cooperative enterprise can legitimately be
viewed a firm as here defined. It embodies persons and privately owned
physical plant. It mobilizes factors of production, produces goods and
services, and relies primarily on the proceeds from the sale ofits product
tomeetthe costswhichitincurs, muchaswouldanybusiness enterprise.
Yet, its economiccharacterdiffers from thatoftheusualtype ofenterprise
in numerous respects. Itis in the organizational anatomy and physiology
ofthe cooperativeenterprisethatits distinctivebehaviorand performance
can, in large part, be explained.76 JOURNAL OF COOPERATIVES 1995
Perhaps a basic difference between the two types of enterprise under
considerationstems from the motivations ofpersonswho undertake their
creation. Investors in the usual type ofbusiness enterprise seek a high
return on their investments. When agricultural producersjointly under-
takethe creationofa cooperativeassociation, theyseekgoodsandservices
providedat cost.The differencebetweentheintended objectivesofthe two
types ofenterprise explains in large part certain organizational arrange-
ments and mechanisms peculiar to each. Uniform treatment to investors
in the profit-seeking enterprise. for example. may be much simpler to




may be compromised. The apparent differences between cooperative and
profit seeking enterprises should not, however, cloud the main issue. In
bothcases, theallocationofeconomicresourcescomesunderthedirection
ofa "single" authority.
The concept ofthe cooperative enterprise in lightoforganization theory
points toward the need for a more detailed knowledge ofthe actual deci-
sion-makingprocesseswithincooperativeorganizations. Inparticular, the
following closely related problem areas are set forth as being worthy of
further study and investigation:
1. Whether or not, and ifso to what extent, cooperative enterprises are
managementcontrolled. Managementmightgaincontrolthrough contriv-
ance or, more likely, through default on the part of the directors. It is
surprisinginviewofthevoluminousresearchoncooperationthatlittlehas
been done to ascertain who exercises effective control in the cooperative
enterprise. There appears to be no work in the literature on cooperation
comparable, for example, to Robert Gordon's Business Leadership in the
Large Corporation.!? Studies oforganization charts, bylaws, and the gen-
eral attitudes ofdirectors and employees are no substitutefor the numer-
ous intensive case studies which are needed to resolve the issues
involved.!8
2. Thegoalsofthe cooperative enterprise. Theissuehereisnotwhether
all of the goals are diametrically opposed to or in full accord with the
interests ofmemberfirms. The pointis thatcertaingoals in certain situa-
tions couldbe inimical to theinterests ofmembers. Are cooperative enter-
prises motivated by survival, for example, with an ensuing tendency to
persist in some cases long after their usefulness to members has passed
away? There are, of course, other goals such as management prestige,
cooperativegrowth, gainsinthe form ofmanagementsalaries, oreventhe
"Hicksian quiet life," which could lead to cooperative policies undesirable
from the viewpoint ofmembers.
3. The extent towhich the cooperative enterprise commands the actual
information needed for expertise in decision making. If the cooperative
policies are to further the ends ofthe member firms, "correct" cooperative
goals are not enough. The road to bankruptcyand failure might easily be
strewn with the wreckage of cooperative enterprises which had the very
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4. The consequences ofthenature ofthe cooperative enterprise'sinter-
nal organization for its performance in dimensions suchas technical effi-
ciency, the level ofreturns to members, selling expenditures, growth, and
progressiveness interms ofthe developmentand adoption ofnewtechno-
logies. In this connection a study ofthe performance ofthe cooperative
enterprise relative to that of the firm prowling about in search of profit
would appear both interestingand informative (as well as controversial!).
Such a study could be expected to provide new insights into the viability
ofcooperative enterprises and their effectiveness in influencing competi-
tion in agricultural markets.
Theory ofthe Firm Adapted to the Cooperative
As suggested above, an organizational framework focuses attention on
the problems associatedwiththe conscious coordinationofactivitywithin
the cooperative enterprise. There is also the issue of the implications of
cooperativemarketingfor theperformanceofthemarketmechanism.This
raises an important question. Having argued that the cooperative enter-
prise canlegitimatelybe viewed a firm, onemightwell askwhetherornot
theory ofthe firm can be adapted to reflect its peculiar economic nature.
In this section we show that by assuming maximizing behavior on the
part of the cooperative enterprise, behavioral relations and positions of
equilibrium can be derived through traditional marginal analysis. This,
in tum, lays the foundation for the more comprehensive task ofadapting
theory ofthe firm, in its entirety, to the cooperative enterprise.
A Short-Run Model
We make the following initial assumptions. Numerous firms are bound
through contractual arrangements to market their entire production of
some commodity, M, through the facilities oftheir non-profit cooperative
enterprise. Eachmemberfirm is a profitmaximizer, has a fixed plant, and
the functions relating the average and marginal costs to output have the
usual V-shapes. Further, the possible output variations of any member
firm are sufficiently small to have negligible impact on the costs and/or
revenues ofthe cooperative enterprise.
Turning to the cooperative, various productive services are combined
alongwith M, the rawmaterial, intheproduction ofa finished commodity,
Y, according to the production function Y = Y(Xj , X2, ••• ,X n, MjZ), where
Xi represents the ith productive service and Z a fixed plant. It is assumed
that (1) theproductionfunction is a single-valuedfunctionwhichspecifies
all ofthe technologically efficientmethods ofproduction; (2) the marginal
physicalproductivitiesarenon-negative inthe relevantregion; and (3) the
isoquants are smooth, and convex to the origin.19 For simplicity, we sup-
posethatallXli = 1... , n)arepurchasedand¥issoldinperfectlycompeti-
tive markets. Thus, Pi =Pli = l, ... , n), and Py = Pywhere Pi is the price
ofthe ith productive service and Py is the price of Y. We assume that the
goal of the cooperative organization is to maximize the price of the raw
material, Pm. for any amount of M which the member firms choose to
supply, but subject to the constraint that all costs, including fixed costs,78 JOURNAL OF COOPERATIVES 1995
F, are met. The cooperative membership is fixed, and the cooperative
stands willing to market all that members wish to supply. Member firms
are to receive uniform treatment (service at cost), which is assumed to be
consistent with returning the same net return per unit of M, Pm- to each
member firm. With regard to the constraint that fixed costs must be cov-
ered, it is clear that a cooperative enterprise facing competition in the
procurementofMmightbeforced to"consume"thefixed plantandeventu-
allypass out ofexistence. Numerous difficulties inherentinsuch a possi-
bility are abstracted away by supposing that the cooperative enterprise
can return to members a sufficientlyhigh price to assure their continued
participation even though revenue is set aside in order to replace fixed
plant.20 Certain implications ofthe relaxation ofthis assumption will be
noted later. If the cooperative were a profit maximizing economic agent,





But 7T = 0 byassumption, andwe mayinquire as to the cooperative perfor-
mance for a given level ofM, M, noting that the cooperative enterprise in






where S may be viewed as the cooperative surplus and is given by the
expression S = PmM. Clearly, a maximum S will determine a maximum
Pm. The maximization of S implies the fulfillment of a cost minimization
conditionand an optimum output condition. As might be expected, these
conditions are exactly analogous to those which must be realized if a
profit-seeking, purely competitive firm is maximizing profit. It may be
worthwhile to show that this is true.
Although the amount ofrawmaterial is fixed, various alternative levels
of Y might be feasible.
21 In order that S be a maximum, any level of Y
produced, Y, must be produced at a minimum total variable cost, where
total variable cost, represented by C, is defined by the equation
n
(3)





C=L PiX;-A[Y(XjX 2 , •••, XnIM,Z) - Yl
;~j
where AistheLagrangeanmultiplier. IfCistobea minimum, thefollowing
conditions must be satisfied:
(5) aC = o· P.= AaY (1 ) ax
i
' 'ax; i = , ..., n
CostminimizationforanygivenlevelofYimpliesthatthecost-productivity
ratioforanyoneproductiveservice, Le., theratioofitspricetoitsmarginal
physical productivity, must equal the cost-productivity ratio ofany otherCooperative Enterprise and Organization Theory/ Helmberger and Haas 79
productive service. For each Y, there will be a corresponding minimum
variable cost ofproduction according to the function
(6) C=crY)
where C = total variable cost.
Equation (2) may now be written as follows:
(7)








A maximum S implies that price is equated to marginal cost. In order to
rule outthepossibilityofa minimum, itis also assumedthatthemarginal
cost function is positively sloped at the point of intersection with the
average revenue function.22
Let Yo represent the output associated with the maximum S, and ATCa
thecOIfespondingaveragetolalcosto.£production.Atthemaximum, then,




For any given level of M, the cooperative will choose to produce the level
ofYthatmaximizesPm. Hence,thereexistsa uniquefunctionalrelationship
between the maximum price of M, Pmd, and the level ofM;
(10)
We will call this relationship the short-run net returns function. Itshows
the maximum price the cooperative enterprise can return to members,
aftercoveringfixed andvariablecosts, forthevariouslevelsofrawmaterial
which they might choose to supply. The shape and position ofthe short-
runnetreturns function depend solelyon the characterofthe production
function, given the prices ofthe productive services, fixed costs, and the
price ofthe cooperative output.23
Inordertoshowhowa particularMisdetermined,weshiftourattention
at this juncture to the member firms. Each member, according to our
assumption, is free to produce whatever amount he chooses. In making
his decision as to how much to produce, each member views the net
returns per unit from the cooperative as invariant with respect to his
output variations and is, therefore, a price taker. This allows setting up
an aggregate supply function for the member firms:
(11)
Where Pms equals the price received by members.80 JOURNAL OF COOPERATIVES 1995
Equations(10) and (11) aredepictedgraphicallyinFigure 1, where SRNR
and SRS denote the short-run net returns function and the short-run
supplyfunction, respectively. Thepoint (Pml,MI) determinesanequilibrium
position for the cooperative enterprise andthe member firms. AnyM<Mml
will allow a Pm>Pml which would call forth an increase in the amount
supplied to the cooperative. Any M>MI will result in a Pm<Pml, which
would give rise to a contraction in the amount supplied. At M = MI , the
cooperative will be maximizing Pm' subject to the necessary constraints,
andeachmemberwill beequatinghismarginalcosttothepricereceived.24
Notice that our results do not depend on the particular shapes offunc-
tions (10) and (11) depicted graphicallyin Figure 1. The net returns func-
tion can take any of a variety of shapes, for example, and still allow an
equilibrium position to be reached. If it is positively sloped, however, it
must cut the supply function from above (moving out along the M axis
from the origin) ifthe equilibrium is to be a stable one. It is interesting to
note that if the net returns function is positively sloped in the relevant
region, the cooperative enterprise increases its return to members by
accepting non-member patronage, even if it pays non-member patrons
the same return paid to members. In general, it appears that the shape
ofthenetreturns functionhas definite implications for cooperativepolicy.
This will become even more clear in the long-run models which are now
taken up.
Two Long-Run Formulations
Passing from a short-run to a long-run situation involves specification
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assumption that it has a fixed plant is dropped and instead we assume
that all productive services are freely variable inthe productionofY. With
regard to cooperative goals, two formulations are proposed. First, it is
assumed that the cooperative enterprise maximizes Pm, subject to the
constraintthatthe costsofproducing Y(excludingpaymentstomembers)




ative output and the production function Y = Y(XI , ••• X ko M). Notice,
however, that maximization ofPm involves determining a certainvalue for
M as well as the value for Xdi= 1, ... , k). In other words, in order to
maximize Pm the cooperative enterprise must determine the amount ofM
whichitutilizesinproducing Y. Thelevel ofMmaybedeterminedthrough
pursuing a policy ofrestricted membership. IfPm is to be a maximum, the
cooperative enterprise mustselectthenumberofmemberfirms suchthat
when each member is in equilibrium (long-run) they will in total supply
a certain amount ofMwhich allows attaining the maximum Pm. How this
can be accomplished will be taken up momentarily.
Inthe second formulationitis assumed thatthe cooperative maximizes
Pm, subject to the constraint that the costs of producing Y (excluding
payments to members) are met, for any Mwhich a freely variable number
of members wish to supply. The cooperative enterprise with this type
of goal may be called an open-membership (in contrast to a restricted-




whereL= PmM. Theessentialdifferencebetweenequation (12) andequation
(13) is thatMis a variablewhosevalue is tobe determined bythe coopera-
tive in the first cas~ and whose value is viewed by the cooperative as a
given in the latter case.
Regardlessofwhichlong-runformulationwewanttopursue, itisconve-
nient to begin by deriving a long-run net returns function. Again we may
consider the necessary conditions for a maximum Pm. given a level ofM.
The maximization problem is essentially the same as in the short-run
model in that although there are no fixed costs, the level ofM is given. A
maximum Pm implies that any level of Y produced must be produced at
minimum cost and that a particular level of Y will be produced such that
the marginal cost ofproduction equals the price of Y.
Forpurposesofgeometricillustration,assumethatgraphsoftheaverage
and marginal cost functions have the typical U-shapes.25 One can then
imagine a whole family ofshort-run average costcurves, each associated
with a different level ofMbutwith all other inputs freely variable. Let us
consider three such curves as depicted in Figure 2, where AC
I
, A0, and
ACS are associated with the three alternative levels of raw material, MI.
M2• and M3, respectively. For each level of M, the associated marginal82 JOURNAL OF COOPERATIVES
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cost curve is equated with Py and the determination ofthe ~orresponding
maximum Pm is straightforward. If M=MI,for example, Pml = (Py - ACI) YI/ MI'
A long-run net returns function exists, then, since each level ofM can be
associated with a correspondingmaximum Pm. The shape ofthis function
will concern us at a later point.
Turningto the member (and potentialmember) firms, itis assumedthat
each is free to vary all productive services in the production of M. Each
member has a set ofV-shaped long-run average cost and marginal cost
curves. It is further assumed that net diseconomies in the member firm
resultata sufficientlylowvolume, relativeto theoutputwheresubstantial
net diseconomies occur in the cooperative enterprise, so that member
firms behaveas pricetakersindecidinghowmuchtoproduce.Itisfurther
assumedthatno netexternaleconomies ordiseconomies exist. The mem-
ber firm's long-run supply curve may be defined for ourpurposes as that
portion ofits long-run marginal cost curve which lies above the long-run
average cost curve. For a given number ofmembers, a long-run aggregate
supply curve is derived by summing horizontally the individual supply
curves.
Let us arbitrarily choose a given number ofmember firms to startwith
andgraphtheresultingaggregate supplycurve, S" alongwiththelongrun
net returns function, LRNR, in Figure 3. It is convenient for subsequent
argumenttoassumean inverted V-shaped long-runnetreturns function.
Ajustification for this assumption could be given following the reasoning
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operateto lowerlong-run costs, but are eventuallyswampedbydisecono-
mies associated with management difficulties ofone sort or another.26
At this point we must reintroduce our distinction between restricted-
membership and open-membership type cooperatives, considering the
former first. Clearly, ifM>Mr, then Pm could be enhanced ifthe long-run
supply curve were shifted to the left until it intersects LRNR at its maxi-
mum. A restricted-membership type cooperative should therefore limit
membership so that the aggregate supply curve is at Sr' At the point of
intersection of Sr and LRNR, an equilibrium exists. The cooperative goal
is attained in that Pmr is thc maximum Pm consistent with the given or
assumed conditions. Eachmemberfirm isinlong-runequilibrium, equat-
ing long-run marginal cost to the price received.
An open-membership type cooperative, however, will not impose a
restriction on membership in order to return to members a price equal to
Pmr. Any firm producing M may join the cooperative. It is possible, then,
that starting with the given number of member firms, other firms may
join the cooperative-thereby shifting the aggregate supply curve to the
right. This being the case, Pm will fall as membership increases until pre-
sumablya Pm is reached, PmtinFigure3, whicheffectivelyforestalls further
entry. Undercertaincircumstances,then, anopen-membershiptypecoop-
erative.will in fact pursue a policy which is inimical to the interests of
existingmembers but beneficial to potential members.84 JOURNAL OF COOPERATIVES 1995
Whether a cooperative enterprise pursues a policy ofopen or restricted
membership might depend on the effectiveness of existing members in
electing a board ofdirectors who will insist on one cooperative policy or
the other. Ifa cooperativeismanagement controlled, however, cooperative
growth as measured bythe amount ofraw material handled, the number
ofmembers, or gross sales might well be one ofthe effective goals.
27
Where the long-run net returns function is positively sloped, both the
restricted- and open-membership type cooperativeswould happilyaccept
new members. In addition, the patronage of non-members, perhaps
restricted in order to satisfY certain legal requirements, would also be
accepted.
In the preceding formulations, traditional marginal analysis has been
brought to bear on the cooperative enterprise. Equilibrium conditions for
the cooperative and its memberfirms were derived under alternative sets
ofassumptions. Thenetreturnsfunctionandthesupplyfunctionwerekey
conceptsusedinthederivation, thefirst reflectingcooperativemaximizing
behavior and the second the maximizing behavior ofmember firms.
There are many directions in which the analysis could be revised and/
or extended. One might trace out how equilibrium positions vary with
changesinthebasic data. Also, othercooperativegoals canbe postulated.
Attentionwas centered on the marketing cooperative; other types ofcoop-
erative organizations could be given similar treatment. Problems ofintra-
organizationalconflictswhich ariseinthe case ofvarious types ofpooling,
multiple product operations, and multi-plant cooperatives have been
abstracted away, butthe analysis maybe extended to include such influ-
ences. Extending traditional price theory to reflect the peculiar economic
nature of cooperative enterprise will necessitate analysis of cooperative
marketing in many alternative structural settings. Such appears neces-
saryfor an understanding ofthe welfare implications ofcooperative mar-
keting. These appear to be someofthe majoravenues for further theoreti-
cal work.
A Postscript
This paper was written with the belief that recent efforts toward the
development ofa theory ofcooperation have been on the wrong track. In
particular, it is suggested that Emelianoff's morphology, which has led
several writers astray, should be abandoned in favor of recognizing a
cooperative enterprise as a decision-making entity. Once this is done,
attention is immediately focused on a cooperative enterprise as an eco-
nomic agent whose behavior and performance are appropriate subjects
for theory and research.
Organization theoryprovides us with a conceptofa firm which compre-
hends the cooperative enterprise as a special type. It provides a guide, as
it were, for the research worker interested in the actual behavior ofthe
cooperative enterprise or, more accurately, in the actual behavior of its
organizational participants. The transition from a theory ofthe firm to a
theory ofcooperation within an organizational framework appears to be
bothstraightforwardand fruitful intermsofdeveloping empiricallymean-Cooperative Enterprise and Organization Theory/ Helmberger and Hoos 85
ingful hypotheses withregard to the economic implications ofcooperative
marketing.
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